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Political destabilisation is the main
risk for economic growth
A new issue of ICPS’s Quarterly Predictions journal will be
published this week. We present our forecast for economic
development in 2003. In our opinion, Ukraine’s economy
will be rapidly growing over the next few years. However,
the dynamic of growth will be very sensitive to political
instability on the eve of the parliamentary elections, which
is likely push government policy off the long)run planning
path. We forecast that GDP will grow by 5.5% y)o)y in real
terms in 2001; in 2002, the growth will decelerate to 5%,
picking up to 6% in 2003
In Q1’01, economic growth accelerated again. Real GDP grew by
7.7% y"o"y. Inflation bottomed out over the last three years. As a
result of business growth, tax revenues of the budget increased, and
so did real wages. The UAH/USD exchange rate remained stable,
under conditions of rapidly increasing exports and dwindling
imports.
In Q1’01, industries oriented upon domestic demand grew the most
rapidly. This was primarily due to a further increase in household
consumption and a rise in investment demand, which was highest in
the accelerating construction and agricultural sectors.
Political crisis undermines the consistency of
government policy
Political tensions are rising on the eve of the parliamentary
elections, having peaked in the outpost of the reformist Cabinet.
This puts the quality of the government’s economic policy under
threat. The Communist and vested interest centrist factions of the
Verkhovna Rada have ended up in an alliance—not because they
aim at the same societal targets; rather, their concerted action
results from a temporary coincidence of political interests before
the 2002 political elections. This alliance can neither develop
common policy nor form a Cabinet, for the parties are guided by far"
from"common ideologies.
In case the alliance succeeds in creating a Cabinet, members of the
government will be more concerned about pleasing the backroom
forces than maximising national wealth. Being aware of the low
capacity of Ukrainian democratic institutions to openly reconcile
various interests, we forecast with a high degree of certainty that
the policies of such a government would not be consistent. The
previous Cabinet, headed by Viktor Yuschenko, set up procedures for
collective decision making that allowed preventing the adoption of
decisions countering government strategy. However, these
procedures are not sufficiently robust to withstand the attempts of
one or another party to engage in discretionary decision making, or
to rescind decisions already made.
If political forces do not reach a consensus regarding the nominee
for the post of Prime Minister, it is likely that the current Cabinet of
Ministers will continue to work in the status of acting Cabinet until
the 2002 parliamentary elections. This variant seems to be less
harmful for economic development, since in this case the
government policy will be more consistent and social welfare"
oriented.
Political destabilisation will corrupt the strategic attitude towards
state policy and create risks of reversing decisions approved in
2000. Yet, the quality of the government’s economic decisions will
not deteriorate too much, thanks to the following factors:
• During 2000, the transparency of the government increased. The
government widely publicised its action plan, discussing the outputs
and outcomes of the state policy. Some interest groups, along with
the structuring of the Parliament, were transformed into official
political groups and parties. As a result, Ukrainians became more
aware of the impact that government decisions may have, as well as
A specific characteristic of the political situation in H1’00, when the
government implemented a number of reforms, was the ideological
consensus between the President, the right"wing and centrist
majority of the parliament, and the Cabinet of Ministers. We define
ideological consensus as an integrity of the following strategic
goals: 1) development of democracy, (2) development of a market
economy, and (3) integration into the EU. Under this consensus, the
government managed to approve a number of decisions, which
allowed boosting entrepreneurship and optimising the use of public
goods. We view the following resources as the most important:
• approval of a realistic budget for 2000 and a ban on non"cash
settlements with the budget;
What changed in 2000?
• privatisation of collective agricultural enterprises (KSPs) and
demonopolisation of lending to the agricultural sector;
• approval of the Privatisation Program, which set the baseline for
transparent and foreseeable sales of state property;
• amendments to the Law “On electricity”, which significantly
restricted the scale of non"payments in the electricity market,
thanks to strengthened contract enforcement in the market and a
stricter system of distributive accounts;
• introduction of a new mechanism for collective decision making
that prevents the approval of decisions hindering entrepreneurial
activity.
Major indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003
(estimate) (forecast)  (forecast)
Economic activity
GDP, millions UAH 172,952 207,600 241,600 281,700
Real GDP, apc* 5.8 5.5 5.0 6.0
Real industrial
production, apc 12.9 9.0 8.0 8.5
Real industrial output, apc 7.6 6.5 5.5 5.0
Gross investment, % GDP
FDI, millions USD (1) 594 1,100 1,300 1,500
Real household disposable
incomes, apc 11.1 8.0 7.0 7.0
Real retail trade, apc 7.5       5.0 4.0 4.0
Prices
Consumer price index, apc 26 13 11 10
Producer price index, apc 21 13 10 8
Labour market
Population, millions 49.3 49.1 48.9 48.7
Real wage, average apc 1.0 3.0 3.5 4.5
Official unemployment
rate, % 4.2 5.0 6.5 7.5
Foreign economic activity
Exports of goods&services,
apc 20.3 5.0 5.5 6.0
Imports of goods&services,
apc 18.9 7.0 8.0 8.0
Current account balance,
% GDP 4.7 3.2 1.7 0.7
Budget
Revenues (consolidated),
% GDP 27.5 26.0 26.0 24.0
Current balance, % GDP 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1
Balance by IMF
methodology,   % GDP "1.2 "1.8 "2.2 "1.1
Monetary indicators
Monetary base, apc 39 23 16 12
М3, apc 45 30 20 16
NBU international reserves,
millions USD 1,539 1,980 2,500 2,760
Official exchange rate
average annual, UAH/USD 5.44 5.48 5.75 5.93
Interest rate on loans,
average annual,
yearly % (2) 41 32 28 25
International
World GDP, apc 4.7 2.9 3.5 3.6
GDP of Ukraine's major
 trading partners
(2/3 of exports), apc 5.7 2.8 4.1 4.0
* apc = annual percentage change
Notes:
(1) according to NBU
(2) commercial banks loans, hryvnias
Sources: State Statistics Committee, NBU, and Finance Ministry;
calculations and forecast by Quarterly Predictions.
of the forces that lobby particular decisions. The new Cabinet of
Ministers will be forced to analyse and weigh each decision
carefully, for the electorate would regard deteriorating conditions
as mistakes of the political forces that formed the government.
• Competition strengthened, thanks to reforms in 2000 and
increased economic activity. The more competitive a market is, the
more difficult it becomes to push through decisions which favour
some (among the many) market agents. Therefore, we anticipate
that the quality of government decisions will remain poor with
respect to the least competitive markets, primarily those where the
government holds a large stake. These would include the electricity
sector, coal mining, oil extraction, and gas supply.
• Units dedicated to professional analysis of government policy
have emerged within the government bureaucratic structure. Thus,
the work of government analysts should contribute to ensuring
better quality Cabinet decisions.
In our opinion, under the present conditions of weak democratic
institutions and continuing political struggle, the implementation of
key reforms before the 2002 parliamentary elections appears to be
unrealistic, since these reforms need to be backed by political
consensus and the priority of national interests. Conversely, the
decisions of the current government will concern only short"term
problems. The price that the country will pay for stalled reforms will
be increased cost of business in Ukraine.
We hope that the implementation of reforms will speed up in 2003,
after the parliamentary elections. In our opinion, the structure of
political forces will improve then, which will allow forming a uniform
parliamentary majority, as well as a government supported by this
majority. The higher degree of political consensus will lay the
foundation for more consistent policies, and will favour the approval
of key reforms.
Entrepreneurship will overcome political
instability
Economic growth creates new opportunities for generating profits,
thanks to increased demand, and businesses are very sensitive to
these changes. If the government crisis is resolved and financial
stability is maintained, business development should proceed
unhindered. Competition is at the heart of this process. To outstrip
competitors, firms make investments and thus raise productivity;
they struggle for the market share and introduce new management
and marketing strategies. Moreover, each year the Ukrainian
businesses are acquiring more experience in working under market
conditions, expanding their business networks, searching for and
finding trustworthy clients, and discovering ways to reduce costs
and increase effectiveness.
Taking into account these factors, we forecast that, despite the far
less rosy prospects for changes in government policy compared to
the previous quarter, the pace of economic growth will still be high.
In our opinion, GDP growth will reach 5.5% in 2001, decelerating to
5% in 2002 and speeding up to 6% in 2003.
During 2001–2002, economic growth will slow down, which will
primarily result from the instability of government policy and
absence of a clear strategy. Industries which require long"term
capital injections and foreign high"tech investments will suffer the
most, since the majority of foreign companies will prefer to stay out
of Ukrainian markets. The same circumstance puts the privatisation
of strategic companies, including Ukrtelekom, under threat and
reduces their value. Yet, we expect that economic growth will not
slow down significantly, thanks to market"like behaviour of domestic
firms and their rapid adjustment to ever"changing political
conditions.
We forecast that economic growth will accelerate in 2003, thanks to
the implementation of reforms and anticipated political consensus
after the parliamentary elections. !
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